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Over the past four years, the increase in terror attacks and the influx of refugees has
created a crisis of secularism in many parts of Western Europe (Modood 2012:5; Torpey
2010:288). This is the result of what Modood (2012:6) describes as the reversal of population
flows of European colonialism. At the same time, the presence of religion in many Western
European countries, while still evident, has become increasingly invisible. The gradual secular
nature of many Western European countries, alongside an increasing presence of Muslims
settling in these nations, has contributed to this so-called identity crisis. Consequently, there has
been recent attempts to prevent the use of overt symbols of religiosity in open spaces (Modood
2015:5). This was evident within the recent attempts in France to ban the burqa, and the even
more recent “burkini” ban (Davis 2011:119). This paper attempts to question whether this
Islamophobic rhetoric that has become widespread throughout Western Europe and the United
States is a result of the increasingly secular nature of many countries within the Western world,
and whether gender plays a role in this relationship. Most of the existing literature that questions
the relationship between secularism and Islamophobia focuses solely on the relationship within
the context of France and other Western European countries. However, it is important to question
whether this relationship between Islamophobia and secularism exists in the United States, a
country which simultaneously contains a secular and a strong religious presence.
LITERATURE REVIEW
In order to understand whether secularism has played a role in the increasingly prevalent
Islamophobic rhetoric within Western Europe and the United States, a conceptualization of
Islamophobia is needed. Put simply, Islamophobia is described as the stereotypical
generalizations about Islam and Muslims that can result in discrimination or harassment
(Moosavi 2015:41). Hatred against Muslims appears in both overt and subtle forms. When
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speaking of Islamophobia, most think of overt discrimination taking the form of physical abuse.
However, the subtle and less transparent forms of Islamophobia are equally as important,
through which Muslims are confronted with hostility and exclusion in their day-to-day lives,
without it being obvious (Moosavi 2015:48). Additionally, a number of scholars have
emphasized the historical roots of Islamophobia rather than framing it as a new phenomenon
(Grosfoguel and Mielants 2006:2; Kayaglu 2012:611; Soyer 2013:400).
Historical Roots of Islamophobia
Islam has been categorized as “other” or inferior to other religions since the 1400s
(Grosfoguel and Mielants 2006:2; Kayaglu 2012:611). The struggle between Christian Spain and
Islam formed part of a longer imperial battle in the Mediterranean that dates back to the
crusades. In 1492, the Christian Spanish monarchy re-conquered Islamic Spain, forcing Jews and
Arab Muslims from the area, while simultaneously “discovering” the Americas and conquering
various parts of the world (Grosfoguel and Mielants 2006:2). As a result, a division of labor was
created, privileging populations of European origin over the rest. At the same time, Jews and
Muslims became the internal “Other” within Europe (Grosfoguel and Mielants 2006:2; Soyer
2013:402; Mingolo 2006:18). In the late 15th century, Jews and Muslims were divided even
further and were classified as practicing the “wrong religion,” placing them as “savage” and
“primitive” people. Grosfoguel and Mielants (2006:8) describe this as the subalternization and
inferiorization of Islam, based on the idea of “pure blood.” This classification promoted the idea
that Islamic civilizations were inferior and uncivilized. However, Andalusian, Mughal, and
Ottoman experiences show that Islamic civilizations were more structured and refined than
Western nations (Şentürk and Nizamuddin 2008:519). This category of “otherness” has
continued to grow and has transformed into a type of cultural racism that frames itself in terms of
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inferior habits, beliefs, behaviors, or values of a group of people (Grosfoguel and Mielants
2006:4). What is seen as the “right” religion is those only supported by a Judeo-Christian culture,
and what is seen as “inhuman” follows from a departure of that culture (Butler 2008:12).
Islamophobia continues to be framed in this way; transformed as a type of colonial racism to a
newly formed cultural racism that targets Muslims as being inherently different and inferior to
white Europeans. While Islamophobia is a form of discrimination against Muslims, it is
important to understand the ways in which gender plays a role within this form of cultural racism
as well.
Muslim Women and Islamophobia
The intersection of religion and gender is important to discuss when conceptualizing
discrimination against Muslims. Veiled women living in Western Europe have been increasingly
classified as inferior because of the overt “Islamic marker” that they wear (Afshar 2008:421).
While all Muslims are subjected to forms of discrimination, Muslim women’s experiences
should be categorized as a different form of exclusion that is not only based on race and religion,
but also gender. The discrimination faced by Muslim women takes both physical and subtle
forms. Drawing off of Edward Said’s iconic work, it is important to conceptualize the subtle
forms of discrimination faced by Muslim women as orientalism (Said 1978:10). This form of
discrimination operates through the eroticization of Muslim women (Said 1978:10; Afshar
2008:421). If Muslim women are not seen as threatening, they are perceived as being exotic and
submissive to their faith (Afshar 2008:421). These assumptions promote the idea that the West
must rush to liberate Muslim women from the "oppression" that is imposed on them by their
faith (Abu-Lughod 2002:789; Afshar 2008:420). This white “savior” mentality and the image of
Muslim women as being “oppressed” works to justify cultural racism that ultimately targets
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Muslims, constructing them as “inferior” and “uncivilized” people who do not belong in the
West (Grosfoguel and Mielants 2006:6). The headscarf, in particular, plays an important role in
the construction of this imagery because it is seen as a "subversive force when it emerges in the
secular public sphere, asserting its own unconventional and nonsecular (Islamic) norms of
privacy" (Çindar 2008:903). As a result, when Muslim women wear headscarves in public
spaces, the piece of clothing imposes an Islamic frame and labels the women as being inherently
different, and therefore a threat to secularism (Çindar 2008:903). The increasingly secular nature
of Western Europe and the United States may have further promoted this cultural racism that
classifies Islam as being incompatible with the West.
Secularism
Peter Berger’s (2012) revised secularization theory helps conceptualize the ways in
which secularism is framed within many Western European countries and in the United States as
well. Berger (2012:313) argues that while there are many forms that secularism can take, it
operates through a decline of religion. This decline of religion is experienced on both micro and
macro levels, encompassing not only individuals being less religious, but also social institutions
separating themselves from religion as well (Berger 2012:314). Berger argues that, “There is
indeed a secular discourse resulting from modernity, but it can coexist with religious discourses
that are not secular at all” (2012:314). This idea is extremely applicable to the United States
formation of secularism that coexists with religious discourses at the same time.
Other scholars have questioned the relationship between secularism and Islamophobia,
specifically within Western European countries (Torpey 2010:280; Modood 2011:5). There are
two ways of looking at secularism that have been previously overlooked: active and latent
religiosity (Torpey 2010:280). Active religiosity refers to people who practice their religions in
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public spheres. Conversely, latent religiosity manifests itself more subtly (Torpey 2010:280).
This latent form of religion can spark an identity crisis when confronted with groups that practice
their religions openly as a result of the increasing secular nature of many parts of Western
Europe (Modood 2011:5). For example, surveys in London show that immigrant groups that
settle in London become increasingly secular, while for Muslims, the reverse tendency applies
(Laitin 2010:431). Consequently, some Europeans question whether or not Muslims should be
allowed to practice their religions openly in a country that emphasizes secular values (Laitin
2010:431).
In order to understand the relationship between secularism and Islamophobia within the
context of the United States, this paper draws on Annalisa Frisina’s (2010) two frameworks of
Islamophobia: the new orientalist and security frames. The new orientalist framework is related
to the work cited above, portraying Islam as the cultural and religious opposite of the West,
therefore classifying it as incompatible to Western values and cultures (Frisina 2010:560).
Additionally, the security frame is important because it is based on a sort of shifting form of
orientalism that promotes ideas of Muslims as dangerous because they are likely to be
“terrorists” (Frisina 2010:560). In this case, Islamophobia is most often justified due to this idea
that Muslims are a threat to “national security” (Frisina 2010:560). While the literature I have
included above are extensive investigations on secularism and its relationship with Islamophobia,
only a few sources discuss secularism and Islamophobia in the United States. Drawing from the
literature above, this paper attempts to understand the relationship between secularism and
Islamophobia in the United States utilizing quantitative data analysis.
RESEARCH METHODS
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This research is based on the data provided by the Public Religion Research Institute's
(PRRI) survey on Pluralism-Immigration-&-Civic-Integration, conducted in 2011 (PRRI 2011).
The data set is composed of a random sample of American adults, 18 years or older, totaling
2,450 respondents. The unit of analysis in this data set is individuals. The data was collected
through phone interviews under the supervision of Directions in Research. The responses were
weighted in two stages. The first stage of weighting corrected for different probabilities of
selection associated with the number of adults in each household and telephone usage patterns of
each respondent (PRRI 2011). Additionally, in the second stage sample, demographics were
balanced by form to match target population parameters for gender, age, education, race, region,
population density, and telephone usage (PRRI 2011). The margin of error is +/-2.0 percentage
points for the general sample at the 95 percent confidence interval. Additionally, the response
rate is 5.67 percent (PRRI 2011). The survey asked questions about political climate in the
United States, including questions about discrimination, September 11 attacks, religion, and
questions about race. For more information about data collection, see the 2011 PluralismImmigration-&-Civic-Integration online.
Independent Variable
Using the Pluralism-Immigration-&-Civic-Integration Survey, I formed the independent
variable from the question that asks whether one completely agrees, mostly agrees, mostly
disagrees, or completely disagrees that we must maintain a strict separation of church and state. I
used this variable to operationalize secularism, which takes the form of the separation of church
and state in the United States. I recoded this variable to give the highest value to a respondent
who completely agrees with maintaining a separation of church and state. The coding of the
variable follows this order: completely disagree (1), mostly disagree (2), mostly agree (3), and
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completely agree (4). Additionally, I used three dependent variables to measure discrimination
against Muslims and Muslim women.
Dependent Variables
The first dependent variable asks whether someone completely agrees, mostly agrees,
mostly disagrees, or completely disagrees that the values of Islam, the Muslim religion, are at
odds with American values and culture. I used this variable to operationalize a form of
Islamophobia because it relates to the idea that Islam is incompatible to Western values, and
therefore, justifies the exclusion of Muslims. I also had to recode this variable to make
completely agree the highest value. The coding of the variable follows this order: completely
disagree (1), mostly disagree (2), mostly agree (3), and completely agree (4).
The second dependent variable asks whether someone is very comfortable, somewhat
comfortable, somewhat uncomfortable, or very uncomfortable with a mosque being built near
their home. I used this variable to operationalize a form of Islamophobia based on the security
frame that labels Muslims as threats to democracy and secularism. If people believe that
Muslims are threats and are incompatible with American values, they may feel uncomfortable
with mosques being built near their homes. I did not recode this variable because the highest
value measures feeling very uncomfortable. The coding of the variable follows this order: very
comfortable (1), somewhat comfortable (2), somewhat uncomfortable (3), and very
uncomfortable (4).
The last dependent variable asks whether someone is very comfortable, somewhat
comfortable, somewhat uncomfortable, or very uncomfortable with Muslim women wearing
clothing that covers their whole bodies, including their faces. I used this variable to
operationalize another form of Islamophobia. When people see the Islamic veil on Muslim
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women, they may feel uncomfortable around them due to the perception of Muslims as threats
and as inherently different to Western forms of modernity. The coding of the last dependent
variable follows this order: very comfortable (1), somewhat comfortable (2), somewhat
uncomfortable (3), very uncomfortable (4).
Control Variables
In addition to the independent variable and the three dependent variables, I included two
control variables in the analysis. The first control variable is religion because I wanted to know
whether a respondents' religious affiliation has an effect on their perceptions of Muslims. I
dummied this variable to measure whether someone is Roman Catholic (1) or not Roman
Catholic (0). It was necessary for me to categorize the religion variable as Roman Catholic or not
in order to achieve an 80 to 20 percent distribution. Respondents who reported not being Roman
Catholic consisted of people who identified as Protestant, Mormon, Orthodox, Jewish, Buddhist,
Hindu, Christian, Unitarian, Atheist, Agnostic, nothing in particular, and something else. I
excluded Muslims, which consisted of only seven cases from the analysis because I wanted to
know how non-Muslims felt about Muslims in the United States.
The second control variable was age because it is said that older generations hold
strongly to religious beliefs, while younger generations have more secular beliefs. The survey’s
age range is from 18 to 94 years (PRRI 2011). Through the analysis, most of the variables I used
are ordinal variables. As a result, I understand that I am violating assumptions by treating
ordinal-level variables as interval level.
FINDINGS
Table 1 reports the means, medians, and standard deviations for all of the variables. The
distribution of the independent variable can be seen in Figure 1. The histogram shows that about
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70 percent of the respondents reported that they agree with the separation of church and state,
suggesting that a majority of the respondents favor having a strict separation of church and state
in the United States. Table 1 also reports that the mean is 2.9 and the median is three. This
suggests that the average level of agreement and the middle value is mostly agreeing with
maintaining a strict separation of church and state. The standard deviation for the independent
variable is one, meaning that there is slight deviation in the variable, however, the standard
deviation is close to zero making the mean more reliable.

Table 1: Means, Medians, and Standard Deviations for All Variables
Variables

Mean

Median

SD

(N)

Separation of Church and State

2.93

3.0

1.028

(2097)

Islam at odds with Amer. values

2.55

3.0

0.991

(2033)

Mosque being built near home

2.55

3.0

1.115

(2078)

Muslim women covering bodies

2.51

3.0

1.102

(2102)

Roman Catholic/ Not

0.75

1.0

0.432

(2134)

53.25

55.0

18.777

(2134)

Age

Figure 1. Histogram of “We Must Maintain a Strict Separation of Church and State”
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The survey asked the respondents' level of agreement with the question, "Islam is at odds
with American values and culture." The distribution of the variable can be seen in Figure 2. The
histogram shows that there is almost an even number of respondents who agree with the above
statement and the number of respondents who disagree with the above statement. This suggests
that respondents both disagree and agree that Islam is at odds with the values and culture of the
United States. Additionally, Table 1 reports that the mean of this dependent variable is 2.6,
which shows that the average level of agreement is mostly agreeing with Islam being at odds
with American values and culture. Table 1 also reports that the standard deviation of this
dependent variable is one. Since the standard deviation is close to zero, there is slight distribution
in the variable, but not significant skew. Also, the standard deviation suggests that the mean is
more reliable.

Figure 2. Histogram of Islam at Odds with American Values and Culture
Additionally, the survey asked the respondents' level of comfort with "A mosque being
built near your home." Figure 3 shows the distribution of respondents who felt comfortable or
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uncomfortable with a mosque being built near their homes. There is an even distribution between
respondents who felt comfortable about a mosque being built near their home and respondents
who felt uncomfortable. Table 1 also reports the mean of this dependent variable as 2.6,
suggesting the average level of comfort is somewhat uncomfortable with a mosque being built
near their home. The median is two, which means that the middle value is somewhat comfortable
with a mosque being built near their home. The standard deviation is 1.1, which shows that there
is slight distribution in the variable, but the standard deviation makes the mean more reliable
because it is close to zero.

Figure 3. Histogram of Mosque Built Near Home
The survey asked the respondents' level of comfort to the question, "Muslim women
wearing clothing that covers their whole body, including their faces." Figure 4 shows that there is
an even distribution of the respondents' who feel comfortable and uncomfortable with the above
statement. The percentage of respondents who are comfortable is almost equal to the percentage
of respondents who are uncomfortable with Muslim women covering their bodies, including
their faces. Table 1 reports the mean for this variable as 2.5 while the median is three, suggesting
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that the average level of comfort is somewhat uncomfortable with Muslim women covering their
bodies, including their faces. The standard deviation is reported as 1.1, which shows that the
mean is reliable and there is only slight distribution in the variable.

Figure 4. Histogram of Muslim Women Covering their Bodies
The survey asked about the respondents' religious affiliation. I dummied this variable and
only showed which respondents identified as being Roman Catholic and which respondents
identified as something else. Around 25 percent of the respondents identified as Roman Catholic,
while about 75 percent of the respondents identified as not being Roman Catholic. Table 1 shows
that the mean for the control variable is .24, meaning that most of the respondents are not Roman
Catholic. Additionally, the standard deviation of this control variable is .43, suggesting that there
is little deviation and the mean is more reliable since the standard deviation is close to zero.
The survey also asked a question about the age of the respondents. The survey consists of
adults ranging from 18 to 94 years. Figure 6 shows the distribution of respondents' ages,
suggesting that most of the respondents were between 50 to 70 years old. About ten percent of
the respondents are 80 years and older. Additionally, about twenty-five percent of the
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respondents are 20 to 40 years old. Table 1 reports that the average age of the respondents is 53.
The median age is about 54, and the standard deviation is 18 years. The standard deviation
suggests that the respondents’ ages ranged from 34 to 72, which makes up about 60 percent of
the respondents. Because the standard deviation is 18, there is significant skew in the variable.

Figure 5. Histogram of Age
Bivariate Results
Table 2 shows the results of the bivariate analysis between the dependent variables,
independent variable, and control variables. The bivariate results indicate a moderate, positive,
statistically significant relationship (r = .324) between the two dependent variables, indicating
that the more a respondent agrees that Islam is at odds with American values and culture, the
more uncomfortable a respondent feels with a mosque being near their home. Additionally, the
bivariate results indicate a weak to moderate, positive, statistically significant relationship (r =
.225) with the other dependent variable, suggesting that the more a respondent agrees that Islam
is at odds with American values and culture, the more uncomfortable a respondent feels with
Muslim women covering their bodies including their faces. The bivariate results also indicate a
14

moderate to strong, positive, statistically significant relationship (r = .494) between the other two
dependent variables, suggesting that the more uncomfortable a respondent feels with a mosque
being built near their home, the more uncomfortable they feel with Muslim women covering
their bodies, including their faces.
In terms of the first dependent variable (Islam at odds) and the independent variable,
Table 2 indicates a weak, negative, statistically significant relationship (r = -.130), suggesting
that the more a respondent agrees that we must maintain a strict separation of church and state,
the more a respondent disagrees with Islam being at odds with American values and culture. For
the second dependent variable, which asks respondents’ level of comfort with a mosque being
built near their home, the bivariate results indicate a weak, negative, moderate, and statistically
significant relationship (r = -.271), suggesting that the more a respondent agrees that we must
maintain a strict separation of church and state, the more comfortable a respondent feels with a
mosque being built near their home. Additionally, the bivariate results indicate that there is a
negative, weak, and statistically significant relationship (r = -.101), between the third dependent
variable, Muslim women covering their bodies, and the independent variable. As a result, the
more a respondent agrees that we must maintain a strict separation of church and state, the more
comfortable a respondent feels with Muslim women covering their bodies, including their faces.
Table 2. Correlations (r) between Separation of Church and State and Dependent Variables
(listwise deletion, two-tailed test, N=1932)
Variables

Mosque

Covering

Church and
State

Roman
Catholic

Age

Islam at odds

.322**

.226**

.129**

-.067**

.106**

.496**

-.270**

.036

.243**

.101**

-.014

.242**

Mosque
Covering Bodies

15

Church and State

-.043

Roman Catholic

.020
-.045

** p < .01

Table 2 shows the bivariate results for the control variables as well. The bivariate results
indicate no relationship between respondents who are Roman Catholic and whether a respondent
agrees that we must maintain a strict separation of church and state. The Roman Catholic
variable has no relationship with a respondents’ level of comfort with a mosque being built near
their home and with Muslim women covering their bodies, including their faces. However, the
bivariate results indicate a negative, weak, statistically significant relationship (r = -.067)
between one of the dependent variables, suggesting that if a respondent is Roman Catholic, the
respondent is less likely to agree that Islam is at odds with American values and culture.
The bivariate results indicate statistically significant relationships between the three
dependent variables and respondents’ ages. Table 2 shows that there is a weak, positive,
statistically significant relationship (r = .106) between age and the Islam at odds variable,
suggesting that the older a respondent is, the more the respondent agrees that Islam is at odds
with American values and culture. Additionally, the bivariate results indicate a weak but almost
moderate, positive, statistically significant relationship (r = .243) between age and a
respondents’ level of comfort with a mosque being built near their home, meaning that the older
a respondent is, the more uncomfortable they feel with a mosque being built near their home.
Lastly, the bivariate results in Table 2 indicate a strong, weak but almost moderate, positive, and
statistically significant relationship (r = .242) between age and Muslim women covering their
bodies, suggesting that the older a respondent is, the more uncomfortable the respondent feels
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with Muslim women covering their bodies, including their faces. The bivariate results indicate
no relationship between age and whether a respondent agrees that we must maintain a strict
separation of church and state.
Multivariate Findings
The multiple regression analysis reported in Table 3 shows that 3.3 percent of the
variance in the separation of church and state, while holding constant Roman Catholic and age, is
explained by a respondents’ level of agreement with Islam being at odds with American values
and culture. Additionally, the multiple regression demonstrates that 13 percent of the variance in
a respondents’ agreement with the separation of church and state, while holding constant Roman
Catholic and age, is explained by a respondents’ level of comfort with a mosque being built near
their homes. Lastly, the multiple regression portrays that 6.5 percent of the variance in a
respondents’ level of agreement with the separation of church and state, while holding constant
Roman Catholic and age, is explained by a respondents’ level of comfort with Muslim women
covering their bodies, including their faces. While the R squared values are small, the F-test
shows that all three of the regressions are significant. Of the three dependent variables, the
independent variable has the most effect on a respondents' level of comfort with a mosque being
built near their home (Beta = -.266). The independent variable has the second strongest effect on
a respondents' level of agreement with Islam being at odds with American values and culture
(Beta = -.127). Additionally, the independent variable has the least effect on the level of comfort
with Muslim women covering their bodies, including their faces (Beta = -.097).
The first control variable, whether a respondent is Roman Catholic, is only significant
with one of the dependent variables, a respondents’ level of agreement with Islam at odds with
American values and culture (Beta = -.070). While Roman Catholic is only significant with one
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dependent variable, the second control variable, age, is significant with all three dependent
variables. Age has the most effect on a respondents’ level of comfort with a mosque being built
near their home (Beta = .249). Additionally, age has the second strongest effect on a
respondents’ level of comfort with Muslim women covering their bodies (Beta = .239). Age has
the least effect on a respondents’ level of agreement with Islam being at odds with American
values and culture (Beta = .113).
Table 3. Regression of Dependent Variables and Separation of Church and State, Roman
Catholic, and Respondent’s Age

p < .01
DISCUSSION
These findings are not consistent with the large body of literature on the relationship
between secularism and Islamophobia in Western Europe. Secularism does in fact have a
relationship with Islamophobia, but within the context of the United States, the relationship is
negative. The results suggest that the more secular an individual is, the more open they are to
Muslims being in the country. The results specifically report that the more a respondent agrees
with the separation of church and state, the less they agree that Islam is at odds with American
values and culture. Additionally, the more a respondent agrees with the separation of church and
state, the more comfortable a respondent feels with a mosque being built near their homes and
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with Muslim women covering their bodies, including their faces. This may be due to the fact that
while there is an increase in secularism in the United States, religion still has a strong presence
within the country.
Berger (2012:4) describes this phenomenon by saying that secularism coexists with
religion in the United States. In fact, he goes against his former theory of secularism by stating
that with modernity comes pluralism. Berger (2012:4) states that Western Europe is unique
because the countries were created by a state church, where the two were not separate, whereas
the United States started out with pluralism (Berger 2012:4). As a result, people with secular
values can be religious at the same time, because the form that secularism takes in the United
States is based on promoting liberty for citizens to practice religions freely. While the United
States promotes freedom for practicing religions, pluralization can become a challenge when
there are too many different forms of religions that coexist in a single space (Modood 2012:5).
As a result, when Muslims are viewed through this oriental frame and are seen as a threat, nonMuslims may feel conflicted when they are exposed to Muslims practicing their religions in the
public sphere (Modood 2012:5).
The multivariate results also report that age forms a positive relationship with all of the
dependent variables. The older a respondent is, the more a respondent agrees that Islam is at odds
with American values and culture, the more uncomfortable a respondent is with a mosque being
built near their home, and with Muslim women covering their bodies, including their faces.
Older generations may hold increasingly prejudiced beliefs against Muslims due to the ways in
which Islam has been portrayed throughout the United States. Additionally, it may be because
the Muslim population has increased in recent years and older generations may not have been
exposed to Muslims practicing their religions openly. As a result, older generations may rely
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more on stereotypical beliefs of Muslims. The multivariate findings show that the Roman
Catholic variable is related to only one of the dependent variables (Islam at Odds), suggesting
that if a respondent is Roman Catholic, they are less likely to believe that Islam is incompatible
with American values and culture. This may be due to the fact that Roman Catholics are diverse
and come from other parts of the world. While Roman Catholicism is not the biggest religious
sect in the United States, Roman Catholics make up about 22 percent of the United States
population (PRRI 2011). Additionally, younger generations of Roman Catholics may have been
raised in households where Roman Catholic values have been passed down. As a result, they
may be more accepting of Muslims.
While the results turned out to show a negative relationship with variables that
operationalized Islamophobia, the bivariate results portray that Islamophobia is prevalent in the
United States. In fact, each variable that operationalized Islamophobia was positively and almost
moderately related to one another. As a result, the new oriental and security frames apply in the
context of the United States. Through the new orientalist frame, the main reason why Muslims
experience discrimination is because of the idea that Islam is incompatible with Western forms
of modernity (Grosfoguel and Mielants 2006:4; Frisina 2010:560). The security frame
perpetuates the belief that Muslims are threats to American democracy (Frisina 2010:560). These
two frames can create the perception that the Islamic headscarf is threatening and places Muslim
women as cultural inferior because it is a “subversive force” when it appears in the public sphere
(Çindar 2008:903). Similarly, mosques can be perceived as threating in Western Europe and the
United States because Islam is seen as the cultural opposite of Western cultures and values,
therefore people can react negatively to mosques and may feel uncomfortable having one built
near their home. Afshar (2008:413) states, “Clearly Orientalism is not merely part of a forgotten
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past; it remains very much at the core of the current history of race and gender in the West and
current wars in the Middle East.” The perception of Muslim women as uncivilized and
“oppressed” has been used to justify United States’ foreign policy and ongoing interference in
the Middle East (Afshar 2008:415; Abu-Lughod 2002:789). Islamophobia is continuously
justified in the United States because of the depiction of Muslims as “backward” and threats to
national security (Frisina 2010:560).
CONCLUSION
In this paper, I attempted to understand the relationship between Islamophobia and
secularism within the context of the United States, and tried to see how gender plays a role in
this relationship. I also attempted to conceptualize how Islamophobia functions through Frisina’s
(2010) new orientalist and security frames. Using the data from the 2011 Pluralism-Immigration&-Civic-Integration survey created by the Public Religion Research Institute, the proceeding
analysis displayed a negative relationship between a respondents’ level of agreement with
maintaining a strict separation of church and state and a respondents’ level of agreement with
Islam being at odds with American values and culture. Additionally, the analysis showed a
negative relationship between a respondents’ level of agreement with maintaining a strict
separation of church and state and whether a respondent was uncomfortable with a mosque being
built near their home, and with Muslim women covering their bodies, including their faces.
Secularism in the United States is particular in that it promotes the separation of church and state
but there continues to be a strong religious presence within the country. Consequently, this may
have played a role in the negative relationship between secularism and Islamophobia in the
United States displayed in the multivariate analysis.
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While this paper portrays important implications regarding the ways in which
Islamophobia functions in the United States, there were a number of limitations in this study.
One important limitation is the data set that was used. The data set had a very small response rate
of 5.67%, which means that it may not be generalizable to the United States population.
Consequently, further research using a different data set is needed in order to formulate results
that are generalizable to the United States population. Another limitation has to do with the type
of variables that were used in this study. Because I used data provided by the Public Religious
Research Institute, the type of questions asked were out of my control. I used ordinal variables,
and as a result, had to make assumptions regarding the responses that were reported in the
survey. While there are limitations in this paper, the results provide an important insight on the
ways in which Islamophobia functions in the United States.
While the results showed that there was a negative relationship between secularism and
Islamophobia, the results displayed the fact that Islamophobia has a presence in the United
States. In light of recent political events that have taken place in the country, it is important to
think about Islamophobia not solely as hatred against Muslims due to the idea that they pose a
threat to security and democracy, but also to view Islamophobic rhetoric as directly related to
orientalist ideas that depict Muslims as “backward” and “uncivilized.” For example, when
thinking of Islamophobia through these two frameworks, it is easier to understand why and how
the recent Travel Ban in the United States was justified. Most of the discourse surrounding this
ban was on the idea that Muslims from “certain countries” should be restricted from entering the
United States due to national security reasons (Laughland 2017). However, embedded within this
rhetoric are orientalist tropes that depict Muslims as “backward” and “uncivilized” people that
are incompatible with the United States’ form of democracy and secularism. In order to
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understand the ways in which Islamophobic rhetoric functions within the two frames, placing
Islamophobia in a historical context is essential (Grosfoguel and Mielants 2006:3). Additionally,
thinking about gender and the way it intersects with Islamophobia emphasizes the need to
challenge Western feminist discourse that reproduces the image of a “Muslim women” as one
that needs “saving” (Abu-Lughod 2002:784). If we continue to think of how Islamophobia
operates through the new orientalist and security frames that are often deployed to justify
discrimination and the exclusion of Muslims, we will be able to challenge Islamophobic rhetoric
and create a more understanding and open community.
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